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REJECTING THE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD
FOR PROOF OF INCOMPETENCE
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cooper v. Oklahoma,' the United States Supreme Court ex-
a-mined whether a state could require a defendant to prove his incom-
petence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence.2 Though the
Court had already upheld one state statute that required a defendant
to prove his incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence," s
Cooper held that the heightened "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard was an impermissible violation of a defendant's fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause not to be tried while incompetent
because it greatly increased the potential for an erroneous decision. 4
The Court relied on a two-part argument, first looking at historical
precedent and then examining whether Oklahoma's rule exhibited
"fundamental fairness in practice." 5
This Note argues that the Supreme Court was correct to strike
down Oklahoma's heightened statutory requirement for proof of in-
competence. By setting such a high standard, Oklahoma virtually
guaranteed that its courts would convict many defendants who were
more likely than not incompetent. This result would have been con-
trary to due process and had no rational justification.
II. BACKGROUND
Incompetency is a mental disability that impairs a defendant to
the extent that he cannot grasp the nature of the charges against him
nor assist counsel in his defense. 6 Because such an impairment could
jeopardize a defendant's opportunity to receive a fair trial, the
Supreme Court has long held that the trial and conviction of an in-
1 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
2 Id- at 1374-75.
3 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992).
4 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384.
5 Id at 1377-80, 1380-83.
6 HENRY WEIHoFEN, ME-NTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 429 (1954).
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competent defendant violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause.7
There are several underlying rationales behind the Due Process
Clause's prohibition of trying an incompetent defendant. First, it in-
creases the accuracy and reliability of the trial since an incompetent
defendant cannot, for example, adequately testify on his behalf.8 The
requirement also enhances fairness, since an incompetent defendant
cannot make decisions regarding the course and nature of his de-
fense.9 In addition, it maintains the "dignity" of the trial, in that an
incompetent defendant may behave in an offensive or inappropriate
manner.'0 Finally, a competent defendant's comprehension of why
he is being punished makes the punishment more just.1I
The Court first laid out the modem two-part test for determining
competency in Dusky v. United States.12 a defendant must have (1) "suf-
ficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding" and (2) "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."13 Six years later, in
Pate v. Robinson,14 the Court gave a more formal definition of incom-
petency, emphasizing that state procedures must be sufficient to pro-
tect a defendant's fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial. 15
Although Dusky established a two-part test for competence, the
Court had not yet been entirely clear as to the evidentiary burden that
defendants needed to meet to satisfy the test'16 In the 1977 case of
7 Medina, 505 U.S. at 439 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1986); Drope v. Mis-
souri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)). It is important to note that incompetency is distinguishable
from insanity in that "it involves the defendant's mental state at the time of trial rather
than at the time of the offense." Stephanie M. Herseth, Competen to Stand TroJ, 84 GEO.
LJ. 1066, 1076 n.1418 (1996).
The Due Process Clause provides that "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.





12 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
13 Id (internal quotations omitted). The Solicitor General actually suggested this test
in his brief to the Court. See id.
14 3883 U.S. 375 (1966).
15 !d at 378.
16 While the Supreme Court had not yet formally considered the appropriate eviden-
tiary standard, there is a long history of application of the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" requirement for a defendant raising the claim of incompetence in both English
courts and lower American courts. Early English cases did not provide a specific standard,
butjudges' instructions tended to use disjunctive language, calling for a determination of
whether or not the defendant was incompetent. See e.g., Queen v. Goode, 112 Eng. Rep.
572 (K.B. 1837); King v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836); King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr.
1997] 1017
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Patterson v. New York,'7 which dealt with raising an affirmative defense
of extreme emotional disturbance, the Court discussed the evidentiary
burden defendants must meet in order to prevail.' 8 Justice White,
writing for the majority, relied on Leland v. Oregon'9 and Rivera v. Dela-
ware20 for the proposition that the appropriate standard necessary to
raise an affirmative defense of insanity was "a preponderance of evi-
dence." 2' Because this case dealt with insanity, however, significant
questions still existed as to the constitutionally required standard of
proof for incompetence.
Two years later, the Court addressed the appropriate standards
for competency in Addington v. Texas,22 where the issue arose in the
context of a civil proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital.23 The Court, per Justice Burger, held that "the individual's
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such
weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify con-
finement by proof more substantial than... [a] preponderance of the
evidence." 24 The Court remanded the case back to the lower court
with the suggestion that the proper standard should be something
"equal to or greater than the clear and convincing standard which...
is required to meet due process guarantees."2 5 The Court distin-
guished civil commitment proceedings from criminal prosecutions,
noting that different standards were both appropriate and neces-
sary.2 6 In justifying the distinction, Justice Burger emphasized that a
307 (1790). A more modem English case cited earlier authority for the proposition that
the appropriate evidentiary standard was a preponderance of evidence. Queen v. Podola,
43 Crim. App. 220 (1959). Early American cases explicitly used a preponderance of evi-
dence standard. See e.g., State v. O'Grady, 5 Ohio Dec. 654 (1896); State v. Helm, 61 S.W.
915 (Ark. 1901); State v. Bethune, 71 S.E. 29 (S.C. 1911); Commonwealth v. Simanowicz,
89 A. 562 (Pa. 1913); People v. Lawson, 174 P. 885 (Cal. 1918); People v. Geary, 131 N.E.
652 (11. 1921); State v. Seminary, 115 So. 370 (La. 1927); State v. Bruntlett, 36 N.W.2d 450
(Iowa 1949).
17 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding New York requirement that defendant in murder
trial prove defense of extreme emotional disturbance).
18 Id, at 206.
'9 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
20 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
21 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206.
22 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
23 Id. at 419-20.
24 1& at 427.
25 Id. at 432. In suggesting that the state establish the necessary facts by clear and con-
vincing evidence, the Addington Court placed involuntary commitment proceedings among
a select group of situations where the individual liberty issues at stake demand this rigid
standard. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (guardians
seeking to end the life of a patient on life support); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (ending parents' rights in their child); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (depor-
tation proceedings for resident aliens).
26 Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
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civil commitment proceeding did not have the same impact as a crimi-
nal trial.2 7 Specifically, Justice Burger observed that the "standard ap-
plied in criminal cases manifests our concern that the risk of error to
the individual must be minimized even at the risk that some who are
guilty might go free."28
Finally, in 1992, the Court directly addressed the appropriate
standard of proof that a state could place on a defendant to prove his
incompetence at a criminal trial. Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-
justice majority in Medina v. California,29 examined a California statute
requiring the defendant to prove his incompetence by a preponder-
ance of evidence.30 The Court upheld the statute, finding it did not
violate the Due Process Clause.3' Significantly, the Court rejected the
petitioner's claim that the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge42
was the proper method to analyze the burden of proof standard for
competency.3 3 Mathews dealt with a challenge on due process
grounds to administrative procedures for termination of Social Secur-
ity disability payments, and the Mathews Court adopted a three-part
balancing test for assessing due process claims.3 4
Justice Kennedy rejected the Mathews balancing test as the appro-
priate way to determine requirements in a criminal procedural case.35
For criminal cases, Justice Kennedy instead adopted the more "nar-
row" due process test used in Patterson v. New York in the context of a
defendant's burden in proving extreme emotional disturbance.36
Under this test, a state's regulating procedures are not subject to due
process regulation unless they offend a fundamental principle of
justice.37
Justice Kennedy then undertook both a historical and opera-
tional analysis, ultimately concluding that placing the burden of proof
on a criminal defendant to establish his incompetence by a prepon-
27 Id.
28 Id (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
29 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
30 Id. at 439.
31 Id. at 452-53.
32 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
33 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
34 The test for analyzing a procedural due process claim involves assessing (1) "the
private interest that will be affected by the official action," (2) "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and (3) "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
35 Medina, 505 U.S. at 444.




derance of the evidence did not violate a fundamental principle of
justice.38 Significantly, the Court based this holding largely on the
fact that it would only affect a limited class of cases in California, those
in which "the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong
as the evidence that he is incompetent."3 9
Although Medina established that a state could require a defend-
ant to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, it
did not address whether a state could impose a more stringent stan-
dard. Cooper v. Oklahoma is factually different from Medina in that
Cooper required the Court to consider whether a State could continue
a trial "after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely
than not incompetent."4° At the time Cooper came before the
Supreme Court, Oklahoma was one of only four states that statutorily
required a defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 41 Oklahoma's statute provided, in relevant part, that
"[t] he court.., shall determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if
the . . . [defendant] is incompetent."42 The general consensus was
that state competency statutes such as Oklahoma's mistakenly adopted
Addington's "clear and convincing" standard of proof for competency
in a civil commitment procedure by applying it to the wholly dissimi-
lar context of a criminal trial.43 Yet, prior to Cooper, the Supreme
38 Id. at 452. The majority's historical approach has been criticized. See, e.g., BruceJ.
Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis
ofMedina v. California and the Supreme Court's New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases,
47 U. MiAMi L. REa. 817, 827 (1993) (arguing that the "exclusively historical approach ...
seems artificial in light of the fact that both the Court in Patterson and the majority in
Medina considered the underlying fairness of the challenged procedural rules").
39 Medina, 505 U.S. at 449. A strong dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Stevens, argued that where evidence regarding incompetency was so unclear as in Me-
dina's case, the defendant should not by default be ruled competent. Id. at 456 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun emphasized that the right of an incompetent
defendant not to be tried was so fundamental and rudimentary that a state must take every
possible precaution to "minimize the risk that an incompetent person will be convicted."
Id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent thus advocated placing the burden of
proof on the state to demonstrate a defendant's incompetency. Id. at 463 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
40 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1996).
41 The other states were Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See id. at 1380.
42 OKIL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (West 1995).
43 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1573 (1996) (No.
95-5207), available in 1996 WL 21695, at *8-*9. (In the oral arguments before the Supreme
Court, Justice O'Connor noted that "the reason States are now experimenting with requir-
ing a higher standard of proof of competency is because of Addington's requirement that to
civilly commit someone the proof must be by clear and convincing evidence of dangerous-
ness to self or others and of mental illness." Id.). Pennsylvania was the only state to have a
clear and convincing requirement prior to the Addington decision. Brief for Petitioner at
22, Cooper (No. 95-5207). Oklahoma and Connecticut switched to a clear and convincing
standard in 1980 and 1981, respectively, while Rhode Island amended its statute in 1993.
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Court had not yet addressed the issue.
IIl. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 8, 1989, investigators discovered Harold Shep-
pard, an eighty-six-year-old man, dead in his home from stab
wounds.44 They placed the date of death as September 4, and later
discovered that Byron Cooper had purchased two watches with the
victim's credit card on September 5.45 Testimony indicated that
Cooper intended to trade the purchases for cocaine.46 On September
19, police officers spotted Cooper in a parking lot and apprehended
him after chasing him down.47 A search revealed that Cooper had a
device known to function as a pipe for crack cocaine.48
Investigators then discovered substantial evidence indicating that
Cooper was indeed responsible for Sheppard's death.49 During inter-
rogation, Cooper gave conflicting testimony to police officers.50
Cooper first admitted to killing Harold Sheppard as well as a second
party.51 He then retracted this admission and ultimately stated that he
simply could not remember. 52 Authorities later found some of Mr.
Sheppard's possessions in Cooper's residence as well as Cooper's fin-
gerprints on items that may have been used in the burglary.55 Investi-
gators also found a butcher knife that, when sprayed with a chemical,
displayed swipe marks commonly exhibited when blood is wiped off a
blade.54
In light of this evidence, on December 4, 1989, the State of
Oklahoma charged Cooper with murder in the first degree for killing
Mr. Sheppard in the course of a burglary.55 Before trial began, ques-
tions arose concerning Cooper's sanity.56 Cooper would not commu-
nicate with his attorneys and apparently believed that his lead counsel
was the devil.57 In August of 1990, Cooper's counsel obtained ajudi-
Id. Wisconsin initially adopted the clear and convincing evidence requirement after Add-
ington, but later changed it. I&








53 Id. at 299. These items included a flashlight, metal can, and watch case. Id54 Id-
55 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-5207).




cial order to evaluate Cooper's competency to stand trial.58 Dr. Edith
King testified that Cooper was incompetent to stand trial, finding him
delusional and irrational.59 The court ordered Cooper to the state
mental hospital.60
Upon Cooper's release, the court conducted a second hearing on
his competency to stand trial that began in December, 1990.61 Dr.
King again testified that she believed Cooper was incompetent to
stand trial.62 However, the court sided with the prosecution's witness,
a psychologist from the state mental hospital who testified that
Cooper was simply malingering. 63 The psychologist believed that
Cooper was not mentally ill, and was both fully aware of the nature of
the charges against him and capable of assisting his attorney.64
The next dispute over Cooper's competency arose over a year
later during a motion hearing.65 Cooper's counsel informed the
court that the defendant had displayed unusual behavior in the court-
room and county jail.66 Investigators from the Public Defender's Of-
fice who had spent a great deal of time with Cooper observed that he
was "cracking up."67 Still, the trial judge declined to change his previ-
ous ruling.68
Trial began on May 4, 1992, at which time Cooper displayed visi-
bly abnormal courtroom behavior.69 To begin with, Cooper resisted
changing into his court clothes because they "burned" him.70
Cooper's attorney then requested another competency evaluation
and, as he was speaking, Cooper crouched in a fetal position.71 When
Cooper took the stand to testify during the competency hearing, he
stated that his lawyer was trying to kill him, his mother had died a long
58 Petitioner's Brief at 2, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 3.
62 Id
63 Id. Cooper's counsel notes in the brief that Russell "did not actually participate on
the team that treated Mr. Cooper, but she had conducted a screening interview ... and
evaluated his progress." Id
64 Brief for Respondent at 6, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-
5207).
65 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
66 Id&
67 Id. It is not clear from the record exactly what caused this determination.
68 Id. The judge made the daft and seemingly ignorant observation that:
We're talking about two things. Insanity as a defense to a crime or incompetence to
assist counsel. So, if an incompetent person is convicted of a crime that he committed
when he was sane, I don't see any harm's done.
Id.
69 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1375 (1996).
70 Id.
71 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
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time ago (when in fact she had testified in that very courtroom several
days earlier), and he thought he had already been acquitted of the
murder charge. 72
The most bizarre portion of Cooper's testimony concerned the
existence of "Noryb," a spirit with whom Cooper supposedly commu-
nicated.73 During testimony about Noryb, Cooper's attorney ap-
proached the witness box.74 Apparently out of fear that his lawyer was
trying to kill him, Cooper became so agitated that he fell backwards
out of his chair and over the railing, hitting his head forcefully against
the courtroom wall.75 In recounting this episode, Cooper's attorney
remarked that, "[t ] he thud on that marble when he [fell] ... could be
heard at the back of that courtroom.... [Hie's just busted his head,
tears are streaming down his eyes." 76
Later in the hearing, five of Cooper's fellow inmates testified
about his strange behavior, stating that in recent weeks Cooper had
cleaned his jail cell as often as ten times a day, talked to himself con-
stantly, and repeatedly handled feces-swirling his hand in his un-
flushed toilet and rubbing it on his face.77 Cooper's counsel also
produced the expert testimony of Dr. Philip Murphy, who stated that
Cooper suffered from a severe, episodic affective disorder.78 The
prosecution countered with testimony from three prison officials who
had not observed any irrational behavior in Cooper in recent weeks.79
After hearing this evidence, the trial court again refused to rule
Cooper incompetent to stand trial °80 The judge noted Dr. Murphy's
credibility and the presence of a significant question as to Cooper's
mental health.81 Nonetheless, the trial judge ultimately concluded
that in his opinion, Cooper failed to meet his burden of proving in-
competency by "clear and convincing evidence."82
72 Id at 5.
73 Id. at 6.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1375 (1996). The attorney further noted that
"[nobody] in the courtroom, Marion Brando in his finest hour could not have faked that
(incident] under that kind of pain and that kind of trauma, it cannot be done ....
[Cooper's] afraid because he has this fear that Noryb's going to be angry with him." Peti-
tioner's Brief at 6, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
77 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 889 P.2d 293, 304 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Petitioner's Brief
at 6, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
78 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
79 Id at 9. These employees testified that they had engaged in rational conversations
with Cooper about current events and this led them to believe that Cooper was more cog-
nizant about his trial then he let on. Respondent's Brief at 9, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
80 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 10; Respondent's Brief at 11, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
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During the trial, Cooper did not interact with his attorney.83 In-
stead, he either slept, talked to himself, or curled up in a fetal position
in the comer of the courtroom. 84 A defense investigator testified that
he was unable to help Cooper with his case because the defendant
refused to speak to him: "I go up to talk to [Cooper] ... and I get
nothing. His pants are on fire, our office is trying to kill him, nothing
to help me with his case, nothing that I can use. Nothing .... I get
nothing from him."85
Cooper's behavior forced the court to address his competency yet
again as the prosecution wrapped up its presentation of evidence.8 6
This time, the court bailiff and deputy observed Cooper eating feces
that he had collected in his hand.87 Again, however, the judge denied
a reevaluation of Cooper's competency.88
After the jury found Cooper guilty, Cooper's counsel presented
additional evidence regarding the defendant's mental condition at
the sentencing hearings.89 His counsel outlined a history of extreme
mental and physical abuse: Cooper's mother was an alcoholic who suf-
fered from schizophrenia; Cooper was without adult supervision as a
child and often lived without food, water, gas, or electricity; Cooper's
mother beat him with her fists as well as a hammer, a baseball bat,
brooms, and electric cords, once even firing a gun at him; Cooper was
placed in a foster home at an early age and often spent the night in an
outdoor geese pen or locked in a closet with a pot to urinate in;
Cooper later went to a state facility where the administrators lied and
told him that his parents had been killed; when Cooper was eleven,
his mother shot and killed her husband and forced Cooper to bring
money into the house by stealing; and, finally, Cooper was sexually
abused in prison at the age of eighteen.90 Notwithstanding these
highly unusual circumstances, the jury voted to impose the death
penalty.91
83 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
84 d
85 Amicus Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 2, Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-5207).
86 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
87 Id.
88 Id
89 Id. at 11.
90 Id. at 11-12. A developmental psychologist testified that Cooper's history was among
the worst she had seen in over twenty years of practice. Id at 12.
91 Id. at 13. The jury recommended the death penalty because of five aggravating cir-
cumstances: (1) previous conviction for a violent felony; (2) committing murder to avoid
arrest or prosecution; (3) an especially heinous murder; (4) committing murder while
serving a prison term; and (5) high likelihood that the murderer would continue to be a
threat to society. Respondent's Brief at 1, Cooper (No. 95-5207).
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On appeal, Cooper argued that Oklahoma's requirement of clear
and convincing evidence to establish incompetency was sufficiently
burdensome to violate his right to due process of law.9 2 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim, upholding
Oklahoma's statute on the basis that " [t]he State has great interest in
assuring its citizens a thorough and speedy judicial process... [and] a
truly incompetent criminal defendant... can prove incompetency
with relative ease."93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether the court of criminal appeals correctly held that the
clear and convincing evidence standard did not violate due process.94
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINION
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens overruled the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, holding that the "clear and
convincing" evidentiary burden on a defendant to prove his incompe-
tence "is incompatible with the dictates of due process."9 5 The bulk of
Justice Stevens' decision consisted of a historical analysis of cases in
which courts refused to try incompetent defendants.96 He concluded
by holding that a clear and convincing standard for proof of incompe-
tency violates due process by placing too high a burden on a defend-
ant to demonstrate his incompetency and hence depriving his
fundamental right to a fair trial.97
Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting the general, long-
standing recognition by the Supreme Court that "the criminal trial of
an incompetent defendant violates due process."98 He then noted a
well-established standard for incompetence: a defendant must (1) be
able to consult rationally with his counsel and (2) have some basic
conceptual understanding of the charges against him.99
The Court next examined the recent case of Medina v. Califor-
nia'00 for support, commenting that Medina allows a state to require
proof of incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."' 0 ' Jus-
tice Stevens emphasized that Medina's holding was relatively narrow,
applicable only in those cases where the evidence for and against in-
92 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1376 (1996).
93 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 889 P.2d 293, 303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
94 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 282 (1995).
95 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384.
96 id. at 1377-80.
97 Id. at 1384.
98 Id. at 1376 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992); Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966)).
99 Id. at 1377.
100 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
101 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377.
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competence was virtually equal.10 2 Importantly, in adopting the rule
of Medina, the Court was careful to point out that the issue in Cooper
was fundamentally different.103 Most significantly, unlike Medina,
Oklahoma's evidence standard affected "a class of cases in which the
defendant has already demonstrated that he is more likely than not
incompetent."' 04
Justice Stevens then began the core of his argument, a historical
overview of the standard required to prove a defendant's incompe-
tency. 105 He noted at the outset that Oklahoma's "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" requirement was without any apparent precedent. 106
Justice Stevens also observed that the general rule against trying an
incompetent defendant traced back to Hale and Blackstone, and that
the first cases supporting this notion appeared in the late 1700s. 10 7
In tracing the development of the preponderance standard, Jus-
tice Stevens examined a series of English cases from the 18th and early
19th centuries in which the judge instructed the jury to determine
whether or not the defendant was competent to stand trial.108 Justice
Stevens then noted that a modem English case, Queen v. Podola,0 9
relied upon the precedent of these earlier decisions to explicitly apply
the preponderance standard for incompetence.110 Justice Stevens
next turned to American precedent, noting that early American cases
relied upon the English standard."' As Justice Stevens noted, by
1896, judges explicitly instructed juries that a defendant must prove
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." 2
Justice Stevens then surveyed modem practice, noting that only
four states require a defendant to prove his incompetence by clear
102 Id. In that sense, the Medina Court was not substantially increasing the risk of incom-
petent defendants facing trial because the rule only affected a narrow class of cases.
103 Id.
104 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Stevens later wrote that
Oklahoma's practice of requiring the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence imposes a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the
defendant is competent. In Medina we found no comparable risk because the pre-
sumption would affect only the narrow class of cases in which the evidence on either
side was equally balanced.
Id. at 1381.
105 Id. at 1377.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1377-78.
108 Id. at 1378. Examples of these cases include Kingv. Pritchard 7 Car. & P. 303 (1836)
and King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790).
109 43 Grim. App. 220 (1959).
110 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1378-79.
111 Id. at 1379. Justice Stevens cites, for example, State v. Harris, 78 Am. Dec. 272, 272-75
(N.C. 1860), which relied on King v. Dyson and King v. Pritchard.
112 Id. (citing State v. O'Grady, 5 Ohio Dec. 654, 655 (1896)).
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and convincing evidence.' 13 Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that
"a number of States place no burden on the defendant at all, but
rather require the prosecutor to prove the defendant's compe-
tence."" 4 The Court also looked to the federal courts, observing that
Congress adopted a preponderance of evidence standard for proof of
incompetence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.115 Justice Stevens concluded
his historical analysis with the observation that a clear and convincing
standard "offends a principle of justice that is deeply 'rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people."116
Justice Stevens next addressed whether the Oklahoma standard
was "fundamentally fair."" 7 He observed that Oklahoma, in setting
such a high standard for proof of incompetency, greatly increased the
likelihood of an erroneous finding of competency." 8 To Justice Ste-
vens, the most egregious aspect of Oklahoma's heightened standard
was that a court may artificially find "competent" a defendant who is
more likely than not incompetent." 9 Because a defendant who is
more likely than not incompetent may be unable to effectively com-
municate with counsel nor understand the charges against him, he
will not receive a fair trial.'2 0 Significantly, Justice Stevens concluded
that the risk to the state of erroneously finding the defendant incom-
petent posed a comparatively "modest" harm.' 21 Justice Stevens con-
cluded this section with the observation that in cases where the
defendant is more likely than not incompetent but does not quite
meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the defendant's
"fundamental right to be tried only while competent outweighs the
State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice
system.' u22
Finally, the Court examined and rejected Oklahoma's two addi-
tional arguments in support of its clear and convincing evidence stan-
113 Id. at 1380. These states are Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Is-
land. Id.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id.
116 Id. (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992)).
117 Id. (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118 Id. at 1381.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1381-82.
121 Id. at 1382. Justice Stevens bases this conclusion on the fact that, if an error is made,
the state can always correct it in a later proceeding, and that an incompetent defendant
may be placed in an institution until authorities can determine whether it is possible he
will become competent anytime soon. Id. Part ofJustice Stevens' distaste for Oklahoma's
heightened standard for incompetency stems from his observation that "even the most
artful malingerer [cannot] ... feign incompetence successfully for a [long] period of time
while under professional care." Id.
122 Id. at 1383.
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dard. 123 First, Oklahoma argued that Patterson v. New York124 afforded
the state discretion to set procedures for the burden of persuasion
and presenting evidence. 125 However, Justice Stevens observed that
Patterson also subjected a state to review in instances where its regula-
tion of procedural burdens upsets a fundamental principle of jus-
tice. 126 Second, Oklahoma argued that the Supreme Court's decision
in Addington v. Texas,127 which requires a clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding, sup-
ports the argument that this standard should apply to competency
hearings as well.128 Justice Stevens quickly dispatched with this con-
tention by noting that competency and commitment proceedings are
highly dissimilar.129 He also pointed out that the Addington ruling in
fact protected the same interest, "the proper protection of fundamen-
tal rights in circumstances in which the State proposes to take drastic
action against an individual."' 0
Justice Stevens concluded by re-emphasizing that, in requiring
such a heightened standard of evidence for incompetency, Oklahoma
allowed a defendant who was "more likely than not incompetent" to
stand trial.'31 By permitting this to take place, Oklahoma's statute vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.' 3 2
Hence, the Court remanded Cooper's incompetency case to be re-
tested under the appropriate standard of "preponderance of the
evidence."' 33
123 Id. at 1383-84.
124 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
125 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383.
126 Id.
127 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
128 Coaper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383.
129 1&
130 Id. at 1384. Justice Stevens went on to comment that:
The [Addington] requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by
clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in lib-
erty. The prohibition against requiring the criminal defendant to demonstrate incom-
petence by clear and convincing evidence safeguards the fundamental right not to
stand trial while incompetent.
lId
132 Id
133 Id. Upon remand, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals directed the District
Court to determine whether a "retrospective post-evaluation competency hearing" was fea-
sible. 1996 WL 528403, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). The District Court determined that
such a hearing was not feasible, so the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded





This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision is both ap-
propriate and well crafted. In Part A, this Note observes that the
lower court's opinion was based largely on faulty logic and did not
deserve to stand. Part B finds that the Court correctly argued that
case precedent supports a preponderance of evidence standard for
proof of incompetence. In Part C, this Note supports the Court's re-
jection of Oklahoma's state interest claim on the grounds that the
individual defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial outweighs any
interest the State may have in a speedy judicial process. Finally, in
Part D, this Note examines the potential impact of Cooper, finding that
it appears to provide grounds for appeal by defendants ruled incom-
petent under the clear and convincing standard.
A. THE LOWER COURT USED FAULTY REASONING IN UPHOLDING THE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals used severely flawed
logic in upholding the clear and convincing evidence standard. To
begin with, the court correctly noted that "in criminal cases, the inter-
ests of the defendant are of such magnitude that they... [require]
standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likeli-
hood of an erroneous judgment." '" Yet this is the very reason that a
clear and convincing standard cannot stand, for it imposes an unrea-
sonably high burden on the defendant. It is not only likely but prob-
able that a court will erroneously judge a defendant competent when
he is in fact more likely than not incompetent, simply because he does
not meet the heightened standard.
A related flaw in the lower court's opinion concerned
Oklahoma's argument that its interest in a speedy trial necessitated a
higher standard of proof for incompetence. s5 In accepting this argu-
ment, the lower court correctly observed that the determination of
incompetency was prone to "inexactness and uncertainty... based on
diagnoses which are... [largely] drawn from subjective analysis and
filtered through.., the diagnostician." 186 However, in the same para-
graph, the court justified imposing a clear and convincing evidence
standard since "[a] truly incompetent criminal defendant, through his
attorneys and experts, can prove incompetency with relative ease."' 37
The lower court was correct in asserting that incompetency pro-
134 Coope, 889 P.2d at 302.
135 I. at 303.




ceedings are uncertain and based to a large extent on subjective evalu-
ations. Indeed, this is the very reason why the standard for
incompetency should not be as high as clear and convincing evidence,
for such a level of proof would be nearly impossible to meet. It is
absurd to suggest that a "truly incompetent" defendant can easily
meet this higher standard of evidence in an age where psychological
"experts" are readily available to the defense and prosecution. The
lower court was so eager to uphold its statute on the basis of the
State's interest in a speedy trial that it did not even formulate a cohe-
sive argument.
The injustice of this clear and convincing evidentiary standard is
especially clear from the particular facts of Cooper. Despite the lower
court finding no evidence that Cooper was incompetent during the
trial,1an even a cursory reading of the facts of the case suggests that
there was ample evidence to find Cooper more likely than not incom-
petent. Expert testimony was sharply divided, and in light of this bal-
ance, the scales certainly should have tipped in favor of Cooper's
incompetence in light of his bizarre actions in court and in jail, his
inability to communicate with counsel or investigators, and his grisly
history of past abuse (which, although not entirely relevant to prove
his incompetency at the time of trial, nonetheless lent a credible back-
drop to the argument that he was currently mentally disabled). The
lower court's upholding of the conviction of a man who ate his own
feces in court, thought his attorney was a devil, and crouched in a fetal
position during a significant portion of his trial, was a grievous and
excessive violation of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.
B. CASE HISTORY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
While the Supreme Court did not cohesively analyze the appro-
priate burden of proof in an incompetence hearing until Medina, Jus-
tice Stevens correctly observed that all relevant case history from other
courts points to a preponderance of evidence standard for a defend-
ant to prove his incompetence. 13 9 It is unmistakably clear from a sur-
vey of early English and American cases that the common law
188 Id. at 304. The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to state that the record was "brim-
ming with evidence" that Cooper was malingering. Id. at 313.
139 It is important to note that there are many cases "irrelevant" to this discussion that
involve placing the burden on the state to demonstrate incompetence by a preponderance
of evidence. As of 1995, Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin all placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove incompetence, and
this was reflected in the relevant case law. Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, n.21 Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-5207).
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standard was a preponderance of evidence.' 40 As Justice Stevens as-
serted, "a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant [than
Oklahoma's] has had a long and consistent application."' 41
In beginning his historical analysis, Justice Stevens made a some-
what strained argument, reaching far back in history to quote the
early English cases of King v. Frith,142 Queen v. Goode,14 and King v.
Pritchard.144 Because these cases did not explicitly mention the stan-
dard for proving incompetence, Justice Stevens relied on language
such as "diligently inquire . . . whether [the defendant] . . . be of
sound mind and understanding or not"'u to speculate that these
cases suggest an instruction of finding the defendant "more likely
than not" incompetent by "phrasing the inquiry in a simple disjunc-
tive."' 4 6 Although it is certainly true that the use of "whether ... or
not" in the instructions from these cases indicates that the jury was
required to balance the evidence for and against incompetence, it is
by no means certain that this entailed a determination of whether the
defendant was "more likely than not" incompetent. 47
Justice Stevens placed a better theory regarding the earlier Eng-
lish cases in a footnote, noting that because there was a great deal of
disagreement among the courts regarding which party had to prove
the defendant's incompetence, "it is unlikely that in cases in which the
burden was placed on the defendant that burden was as weighty as
clear and convincing evidence." 48 This is a more reasonable infer-
ence, as it is certainly unlikely that if there was no set standard among
the English courts a requirement as high as clear and convincing evi-
dence could take hold.
Once Justice Stevens begins to cite English and American cases
from the twentieth century, it becomes clear that there is simply no
precedent for a clear and convincing evidentiary requirement. Courts
explicitly adopted the preponderance of evidence standard at the
turn of the century. As early as 1896, in State v. O'Grady,149 the court
informed an Ohio jury that the "burden is upon the prisoner to show
140 See, e.g., State v. O'Grady, 5 Ohio Dec. 654 (1896); Queen v. Podola, 43 Grim. App.
220 (1959).
141 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377.
142 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790).
143 112 Eng. Rep. 572 (KB. 1837).
144 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836).
145 Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. at 311.
146 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1378.
147 Justice Stevens again relies on his grammatical theory when describing early Ameri-
can cases. Id. at 1379. The opinion's historical analysis would have been sufficient without
this argument.
148 Id at 1378 n.10.
149 5 Ohio Dec. 654 (1896).
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by a preponderance of the proof that he is insane,"150 while in Com-
monwealth v. Simanowicz,151 the court ruled that competence is "de-
cided by a preponderance of the evidence." 52
The cases Justice Stevens discusses are by no means the only ex-
amples. Early American case history abounds with application of the
preponderance of evidence test for proving incompetence at the time
of trial. As early as 1901, the Supreme Court of Arkansas explicitly
adopted the preponderance standard in ruling on a case in which the
defendant could not fully understand the nature of the charges
against him because of the cumulative effects of extensive morphine
usage. 153 Ten years later, the Supreme Court of South Carolina con-
sidered a case in which the defendant had apparently become insane
since conviction, and held that "[tihe plea of [present] insanity is an
affirmative defense, and must be established by the party interposing
it by the preponderance of evidence." 154
In the 1918 case of People v. Lawson,155 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia noted that when determining "whether the defendant was in-
sane ... when arraigned for judgment... it was incumbent on the
defense to show this [incompetence] by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." 156 Three years later, in People v. Geary,157 the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in considering whether the defendant had "become lunatic
or insane since the entry of the original judgment" noted that "he is
required, under the law, to establish his [present] insanity by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence."' 58 Similarly, in 1927, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana began its analysis in State v. Seminaty'59 with the
observation that, in, determining present incompetence to stand trial,
"we are confronted with the presumption of law that every man is pre-
sumed to be sane until the contrary is proven by a preponderance of
evidence." 160 Over twenty years later, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in
State v. Bruntlett,161 mirrored this analysis with the comment that
"[t] he burden of proof is upon appellant to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence a claimed plea of insanity" at the time of trial.162
150 1& at 655.
151 89 A. 562 (Pa. 1913).
152 Id. at 563.
153 State v. Helm, 61 S.W. 915, 918 (Ark. 1901).
154 State v. Bethune, 71 S.E. 29, 32 (S.C. 1911).
155 174 P. 885 (Cal. 1918).
156 Id. at 888.
157 131 N.E. 652 (Ill. 1921).
158 Id at 655.
159 115 So. 370 (La. 1927).
160 Id. at 372.
161 36 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa 1949).
162 Ia at 455.
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In light of this long history of requiring a defendant to prove his
incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence,
Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence requirement is not credi-
ble. There is simply no precedent for this heightened standard.
C. OKLAHOMA'S STATE INTEREST ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED
BECAUSE OF THE GREATER INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Oklahoma's most compelling argument for the heightened stan-
dard is that, under the federalist system, it is the State's function to
establish guidelines for its criminal justice system.163 Hence, because
of Oklahoma's strong interest in a speedy judicial process, the clear
and convincing evidence requirement must stand. 64 Essentially,
Oklahoma argued that an erroneous determination of competency
would indefinitely postpone a trial from taking place, which would
work to the defendant's advantage and burden the state's re-
sources. 165 Interestingly, fifteen states supported Oklahoma's right to
establish this heightened burden of proof in an amicus brief to the
Court. 1 6 6
However, while a state normally has the power to regulate inter-
nal procedures, including the burden of proof, such regulations may
be scrutinized and overturned if they offend "some principle ofjustice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked fundamental." 67 Thus, Justice Stevens correctly asserted that
while Oklahoma did have the right to determine its criminal burdens
and procedures, the clear and convincing evidence standard that it
imposed violated a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.168
163 See Brief for Respondent at 39, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-
5207). "Under the concept of federalism, the states are free to tailor their own standards
of proof as applicable to the particular interests at stake."
164 Id. at 30.
165 Id.
166 Amicus Brief of the State of Utah, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (No.
95-5207). Utah was joined by Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vir-
ginia. The brief stated that:
The 'clear and convincing' incompetency proof standard reasonably accommodates
conflicting legal and pragmatic pressures. The public and criminal defendants have a
powerful interest in expeditious criminal prosecutions. Criminal defendants also have
an interest against erroneously being found incompetent. Requiring that incompe-
tency be clearly and convincingly proven, rather than proven merely by a preponder-
ance of evidence, protects all these interests.
Id. at 3. Of the states joining this Amicus Brief, only three applied the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard for a defendant to prove incompetency. The other states apparently
were supporting Oklahoma out of federalist concerns, not to support Oklahoma's eviden-
tiary standard.
167 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977).
168 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1382 (1996).
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Justice Stevens made this determination largely by weighing the risk
that an incompetent defendant might be convicted against the state's
interest in a speedy trial.169 Hence, it is instructive to examine a few
prior cases where the Supreme Court has similarly weighed the inter-
ests of the state and individual to determine the appropriate burden
of proof.
The most important decision that weighed state and individual
interests was Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.170 There,
the Court considered the appropriate burden of proof when the
guardians of an incompetent person on life-support seek to terminate
her life.171 Missouri required that the guardians demonstrate the in-
competent's wishes by clear and convincing evidence, and the Court
upheld this heightened standard by weighing the interest in the "pro-
tection and preservation of human life" against mistakenly terminat-
ing the surrogate's life. 172 More specifically, making the incorrect
decision not to terminate the patient's life would lead to "a mainte-
nance of the status quo" and possible new developments in medicine
and science, while incorrectly stopping life support "is not susceptible
of correction." 173 In making its ruling, the Court observed that "[t ]he
more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that
party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." 174 By requiring a de-
fendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence,
Oklahoma increased the likelihood of an erroneous finding of
competency.
In Santosky v. Kramer,'75 the Court considered a New York statute
that required a preponderance of evidence to allow the State to per-
manently end parents' rights in their child.176 The Court held that a
stricter standard of clear and convincing evidence was required,
weighing the irrevocable severance of parents' rights in their child
against the State's interest in placing the child in an alternate
home.177
In Woodby v. INS,178 the Court looked at two cases involving de-
169 lI at 1383.
170 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
171 Id
172 Id. at 280-81.
173 Id. at 283.
174 &L
175 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
176 This includes "[denial of] physical custody, as well as the rights ever to visit, commu-
nicate with, or regain custody of the child." Id. at 749.
177 Id. at 747-48, 767.
178 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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portation orders for resident aliens.17 9 Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, concluded that the government must "establish the facts sup-
porting deportability by clear... and convincing evidence." 180 Justice
Stewart weighed the "immediate hardship of deportation," namely ex-
pulsion from the United States and the severance of all ties to this
country, against the state's interest in meeting a lower standard of evi-
dence since deportation is not a criminal proceeding.' 81 As in
Santosky, which involved the liberty interests of parents' rights in their
child, the Woodby Court ruled that a state could only terminate the
liberty interests of persons subject to deportation by a heightened
standard. Oklahoma ignored this precedent by requiring defendants
who have a fundamental right not to be tried while incompetent to
bear the burden of demonstrating their incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence.
Finally, in Addington v. Texas, 82 a case that Oklahoma errone-
ously relied on for its heightened evidentiary standard, the Court con-
sidered the appropriate standard of proof in a civil commitment
proceeding for involuntary commitment to a state mental institu-
tion.183 Chief Justice Burger held that an individual's interest in be-
ing erroneously placed in an institution, and hence deprived of his
liberty, outweighed the state's interest in caring for mentally disturbed
individuals as well as protecting the rest of the populous from the
"dangerous tendencies of... [the] mentally ill."184 Hence, ChiefJus-
tice Burger required that the state demonstrate the need for confine-
ment by clear and convincing evidence. 185
It is clear from these cases that, in considering the appropriate
standard of evidence, the Supreme Court has routinely established a
heightened standard to protect fundamental individual liberties. In
Cruzan, the interest at stake was the termination of a patient's life by
guardians.186 The state's interest in preserving a human life far out-
weighed the guardians' interest in respecting the patient's wishes to
terminate her life.187 Only if it was nearly certain that the patient had
indeed wished to go off life support could the Court find in the guard-
179 Id.
180 Id. at 277.
181 Id. at 286. The Court also noted that the clear and convincing evidence standard
applies in the related cases of denaturalization and expatriation. Id. at 285.
182 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 426.
185 Id at 427.
186 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 264 (1990).
187 Id. at 286-87.
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ians' favor.' 88 Similarly, in Santosky, the Court required a heightened
standard to prevent the state from permanently taking children from
their natural home. 89 In Woodby, the Court held that the severity of
expelling someone from the United States compelled clear and con-
vincing evidence that the facts presented as proof for deportation are
true.190 Finally, in Addington, the Court required the state to prove
the need for involuntary confinement to a mental institution by clear
and convincing evidence because of the individual's liberty
interests. 191
The Supreme Court has imposed a clear and convincing evidence
requirement where it is necessary to protect an individual's funda-
mental rights. The Court has long held that in criminal cases it is far
worse to convict an innocent party than to let a guilty party go free. 92
Applied to the context of incompetency, imposing a clear and con-
vincing evidence requirement on a defendant substantially increases
the likelihood that a court will erroneously convict a defendant who is
mentally incompetent. In fact, under the Oklahoma standard, a court
may convict and punish a defendant who demonstrates that he is
more likely than not incompetent. In Cooper, the Oklahoma court was
prepared to execute a defendant who provided ample evidence of in-
competence at trial. This is unquestionably an abridgment of the in-
dividual's fundamental right to a fair trial. Hence, the interest of the
state in a speedy prosecution is outweighed by the defendant's funda-
mental interest in not being tried while incompetent, as well as the
fact that an erroneous finding of incompetence simply means that the
defendant will be institutionalized until found sane to stand trial.
D. THE IMPAc OF COOPER
The most immediate effect of Cooper was that Oklahoma almost
immediately revised its statute, changing the language "clear and con-
vincing" to "preponderance of the evidence." 93 It appears that at
188 Id. at 283.
189 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
190 Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
'91 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
192 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
193 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (West Supp. 1996). This is not the first time
that Oklahoma has changed its statute based on a Supreme Court ruling. In 1988, the
Court, also in an opinion byJustice Stevens, ruled that an Oklahoma statute which allowed
the death penalty for a child of fifteen who committed murder was unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838
(1988). Thompson actually raised very similar issues to Cooper For example, as in Cooper,
the Court considered federalist concerns, namely that a state should set its own juvenile
justice standards. Id at 823-24. The Court also looked at the practice of other states as in
ooper, observing that no other state statute permitted execution of children under 16. Id.
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least two of the other three states that had such a high evidentiary
standard have already followed suit.1 94 There is certainly every reason
to believe that prisoners in Oklahoma, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
and Pennsylvania who were found incompetent at trial will now have
grounds for appeal. 195 In Oklahoma, one possible limitation is the
requirement that a retrospective competency determination can only
take place if credible evidence still exists. 196 It is not clear whether
this requirement will conflict with Oklahoma's change in statutory
language. Certainly it is possible that where credible evidence such as
witnesses and testimony no longer exists, the case may simply be re-
manded and re-tried, as occurred after the Supreme Court's decision
in Cooper.
In addition to changing its statute to reflect a preponderance of
evidence standard, Oklahoma courts have quickly accepted the
Supreme Court's ruling. In October, 1996, Roderick Smith, sen-
tenced to death by the District Court of Oklahoma County, appealed
to the Court of Criminal Appeals.197 One ground for his appeal was
that Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence standard was uncon-
stitutional, and the court, relying on Cooper, agreed that this standard
violated due process. 198 However, the court of appeals did not re-
mand the case because the facts clearly indicated that "[tihe defense
failed to prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Smith] was
incompetent to stand trial."199 While this case does not speak directly
to an appeal based on conviction under the old statute, it does
demonstrate the court's ready acceptance of Cooper.
More significantly, the Tenth Circuit has implicitly acknowledged
that defendants convicted under Oklahoma's unconstitutional clear
and convincing evidence standard will be able to appeal their convic-
tions. In August, 1996, the court considered the claim of Steven
Hatch, a defendant sentenced to death who filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.200 One of Hatch's claims "[contended] that his origi-
at 829.
194 Court Tightens Standard of Fitness to Stand Tria WALL ST.J., Apr. 17, 1996, at B2. As of
the writing of this Note, only Connecticut had not yet changed its standard. See CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-56d(b) (1995); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7403(a) (West Supp. 1996); RI. GEN.
LAws § 40.1-5.3-3(b) (West Supp. 1996).
195 It is also important to realize that it is highly likely that many attorneys did not even
attempt to raise the incompetence argument in these states because they knew how diffi-
cult it would be to meet such a rigorous standard.
196 See, e.g., Tate v. Oklahoma, 896 P.2d 1182 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
197 Smith v. Oklahoma, No. F-94-1199, 1996 WL 557818, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 1,
1996).
198 I& at *2.
199 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
200 Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1013 (10th Cir. 1996).
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nal competency determination was constitutionally flawed under
Cooper, and thus he is entitled to file a second... petition."20' The
court found that Hatch was not entitled to a successive habeas corpus
petition because his "competency to stand trial was not determined under
the Oklahoma scheme invalidated in Cooper."20 2 In emphasizing that
Hatch was found incompetent under an entirely different statute,203
the court implicitly stated that a defendant ruled incompetent under
the statute at issue in Cooper would have standing for appeal.20 4
By amending its statute to a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard for incompetence, readily accepting Cooper in its courts within
several months of the Supreme Court's decision, and implicitly hold-
ing that a defendant convicted under the unconstitutional standard
will have grounds for appeal, Oklahoma appears more than willing to
consider appeals from convicts found competent under the old
standard.2 05
VI. CONCLUSION
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma's
requirement that a defendant prove his incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence violated Due Process by depriving the defendant
of his fundamental right to a fair trial. This holding is wholly consis-
tent with the history of incompetency cases in England and America,
which demonstrates consistent application of a preponderance of evi-
dence standard until recently. The only flaw in the Court's decision
was its reliance on the language of very early cases as proof of the
preponderance standard. Notwithstanding this minor glitch, it is emi-
nently clear that placing a clear and convincing requirement on the
defendant has no foundation. Such a standard deprives a defendant
of his fundamental right to be competent at trial, enabling an
Oklahoma court to convict and punish a defendant who is unable to
201 Id. at 1015.
202 Id. (emphasis added).
203 "Unlike Mr. Cooper, who was forced to prove his incompetence by clear and con-
vincing evidence, the statutory scheme under which Hatch was found competent simply
called for a medical determination by state doctors whether the defendant was 'presently
sane' or 'presently insane.'" Id. (citations omitted).
204 I&
205 There are several decisions from the past few years where a defendant found compe-
tent under the clear and convincing evidence standard may be able to make a successful
appeal. In Valdez v. Oklahoma, for example, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a death
sentence for a defendant found incompetent under the old standard, noting that "the trial
court's finding of competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. An accused at the
post-examination competency hearing is presumed competent and thus bears the burden
of proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence." Valdez v. Oklahoma, 900
P.2d 363, 367, 369 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
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communicate with his attorney nor understand the nature of the
charges and proceedings against him.
Justice Stevens correctly asserted that Oklahoma's requirement of
proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence was far too
high. Moreover, as Justice Stevens emphasized, there is comparatively
little harm in mistakenly finding a defendant incompetent, for he will
simply be sent to a state mental hospital until found sane and then re-
tried. In other words, an erroneous finding of incompetency will do
little more than postpone the trial.206 Although somewhat burden-
some to the state, this is far less costly than convicting a defendant
unable to assist in or understand his defense. By requiring such a
high standard of proof for incompetence, Oklahoma simply increased
the likelihood that a court would erroneously find a defendant com-
petent even if that defendant is incapable of understanding the pro-
ceedings or assisting in his defense. Such a result violates the
fundamental due process right to a fair trial.20 7 This requirement sim-
ply could not stand.
ALAYA B. MEYERS
206 There are, of course, more severe consequences of placing a defendant who is not
actually incompetent in a mental home, namely that he takes away space that could go to
treat those who are truly mentally ill and that he may pose a threat to hospital staff and
patients. SeeAmicus Brief of the State of Utah at 16, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373
(1996) (95-5207).
207 See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). A state violates due process rights
when it does not "observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be
tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial." Id. at 172.
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